Needed: An Armey Commission on the Budget by Weidenbaum, Murray L
Washington University in St. Louis 
Washington University Open Scholarship 
Murray Weidenbaum Publications Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy 
Policy Brief 162 
12-1-1995 
Needed: An Armey Commission on the Budget 
Murray L. Weidenbaum 
Washington University in St Louis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/mlw_papers 
 Part of the Economics Commons, and the Public Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Weidenbaum, Murray L., "Needed: An Armey Commission on the Budget", Policy Brief 162, 1995, 
doi:10.7936/K7JH3JC2. 
Murray Weidenbaum Publications, https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/mlw_papers/140. 
Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy — Washington University in St. Louis 
Campus Box 1027, St. Louis, MO 63130. 
.. 
Center for 




NOT FOR RELEASE 
BEFORE 1 0:30 A.M. EST 
DECEMBER 6, 1995 
Needed: An Armey 
Commission on the Budget 
Murrray Weidenbaum 






Washington University Campus Box 1208 One Brookings Drive St. Louis. Missouri 63130-4899 
Needed: An Armey Commission 
on the Budget 
by Murray Weidenbaum 
Voting to approve the general idea of a balanced budget is a fme start on the path of 
fiscal sensibility, but only a start. The really tough job is ahead - to identify the specific 
spending cuts that should be made and to attract sufficient public support for such tough action. 
Each of us wants to cut the other guy's pet projects. 
We surely know how the United States arrived at this situation. Powerful interest 
groups push very hard for the particular spending programs that benefit them. Few legislators 
- or presidents - want to stand up against a strong one-issue group of voters that promises to 
have a long memory. And for good reason. Cutting or even eliminating any specific program 
will not close the gap between federal revenues and expenditures. Yet the attempt to do so 
could well result in the defeat of those identified with the foolhardy effort. 
Is there a way out? Perhaps. The solution may lie with the innovative concept 
designed by Congressman Dick Armey to eliminate obsolete military bases. Under that 
approach, a bipartisan blue-ribbon commission recommends an array of facilities to be closed, 
and the Congress has to take an up-or-down vote on the entire package. In this spirit, a 
bipartisan commission on federal expenditures should develop comprehensive federal program 
reductions and terminations for the decade ahead. The Congress should be required to vote on 
the entire proposal, making no exceptions for individual programs. 
There would be a great deal of practical advantage to the comprehensive budget-cut 
approach. It appeals to our basic sense of fairness . When everybody's ox is getting gored, 
nobody can say that they are being picked on. To put it somewhat more elegantly, we can cite 
an old Budget Bureau maxim: good budgeting is the uniform distribution of dissatisfaction. 
Murray Weidenbaum is chairman of the Center for the Study of American Business and 
Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor at Washington University in St. Louis. He is 
indebted to Richard Vedder for helpful suggestions. This paper is based upon a presentation to the 
American Enterprise Institute in Washington D.C. on December 6, 1995. 
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It would be helpful if the commission proposal was accompanied by a commitment by 
the Congress not to cancel the planned reductions or to initiate offsetting new spending 
programs except by a two-thirds vote. My colleague (economist) Richard Vedder notes that, in 
effect, fiscal policy would be turned over to the blue-ribbon commission in the way monetary 
policy is assigned to the Federal Reserve System. 
Guidelines for Budget Cutting 
Let us assume that we have the assignment of preparing guidelines to assist the 
members of the commission in their arduous task. As someone who has participated in quite a 
few efforts to cut deficit spending, I know that the most popu1ar formula- eliminating waste, 
fraud, and abuse - just will not work. Of course, there are numerous individual examples of 
fraud or waste or abuse. The reports of prisoners who illegally receive social security checks 
are surely upsetting, and such abuses shou1d be promptly eliminated. Attempts by companies 
to sell the government shoddy and dangerous products shou1d be dealt with severely. Surely 
there is no basis or need to contend that everything the feds do is efficient and high-minded. 
However, I have not found very significant differences in the level of integrity between 
the public and private sectors. Each has a full quota of rogues and slackers. The more 
relevant point is that there simply are not enough proven instances of waste, fraud, and abuse 
to make a real dent in the budget. 
The guidelines for fundamental budget cutting should be substantive and relate to 
fundamental priorities. Here is one for starters. For a nation with the low saving and 
investment levels of the United States, reductions should focus on the large consumption part of 
the federal budget rather than the small investment component. Such an emphasis would curb 
the present tendency for federal deficit financing to be a powerful mechanism for converting 
private saving into public consumption. There is no need, however, to give a free ride to every 
item labeled "investment;" my fifth guideline provides some help on that score. 
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A second guideline is to target the many subsidy programs that provide special benefits 
to limited - and not especially worthy -parts of the national population at the expense of the 
national taxpayer. 
A third guideline is to avoid funding expenditure programs that are designed to offset 
problems created l:Jy other federal activities, such as regulation. Surely, a more cost-effective 
way of dealing with the problem is to change the original regulation, etc., that created the 
problem. To maintain the status quo is to ensure fiscal perpetual motion. 
A fourth guideline is to privatize activities which should properly be the responsibility of 
the private sector. The need here is to go beyond the useful notion of having the private sector 
produce items under government contract. Although an improvement over relying on 
government arsenals, this now conventional approach to privatization still leaves the activity in 
the federal budget. Many goods and services should no longer be paid for by the taxpayer no 
matter who produces them. 
A fifth guideline for sensible budget cutting is to introduce basic economic efficiency 
considerations in the budget preparation and review process. The key to success is to enforce 
the use of this guideline. For example, benefit-cost analysis has often been used to sanctify the 
pork barrel. This has been done by overly generous estimates of benefits and niggardly 
estimates of costs. As has been done in the case of proposed regulations, the calculations 
should be reviewed by an independent agency, such as the Office of Management and Budget. 
Let us take up each of the five guidelines. 
Reducing Federal Consumption-Oriented Outlays 
To this economist, deficit financing per se may not always be sinful. At least in theory 
and like private enterprises, governments can borrow to make useful investments with an 
attractive future payoff. On occasion, the federal government actually does make worthwhile 
investments. Many in my generation benefited from the post-World War IT GI Bill. The 
federal government's outlays for our education helped us to achieve careers in which our added 
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incomes generated added tax payments that more than repaid the government's original 
investment. 
Alas, such examples of effective federal investment outlays are rare. Numerous public 
works projects barely show a favorable benefit-cost ratio even when an unrealistically low cost 
of capital is used in the estimation process. But that overlooks a more basic point. Virtually 
the entire increase in federal outlays since 1980 has been in the form of consumption-type 
spending - aside from defense expenditures and interest on the national debt. As a result, 
consumption outlays dominate the federal budget. In 1992, federal civilian investment outlays 
were estimated at only $83 billion out of a total budget of $1.381 billion. 
Under these circumstances, large reductions in the budget deficit would seem to be 
e~onomically beneficial. Generally, a lower deficit should foster economic growth by making 
more funds available for private investment at the expense of publicly financed consumption. 
If that is a hanging offense in the eyes of the proponents of a larger public sector, so be 
it. Let us suffer the consequences of diminished deficit financing quickly. The Congressional 
Budget Office makes the same point in somewhat more restrained prose: "The progressive 
elimination of the federal government's competition for funds in private capital markets would 
lower interest rates and slightly increase the potential growth of the economy over the next 
decade." 
To carry out a comprehensive reordering of budget priorities, it is necessary to proceed 
from the general to the specific. By far, the dominant segment of federal consumption outlays 
consists of transfer payments. I fmd it interesting to note that the layman's reference to these 
items has moved from handouts to entitlements. 
It is perhaps too harsh to ask why anyone is entitled to a handout from the national 
Treasury. Unfortunately, in the largest such programs- social security and medicare- the 
recipients have been led (or should we say misled) to believe that they have earned the money 
they receive. Each of them has a social security card supposedly representing their individual 
accounts in the U.S. treasury. 
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The truth is more complicated. The typical beneficiary has indeed contributed a 
substantial share of the monthly check issued to him or her by the Treasury. However - a 
fundamental but universally overlooked "however" - the total of such contributions plus 
matching employer payments plus interest does not begin to cover the monthly benefit 
payments. The balance is a gift from the working population. While I was still in the White 
House, I had the audacity to label that gift as the economic equivalent of welfare. There were 
immediately calls in the Congress for my impeachment. Ronald Reagan, bless him, ignored 
such ill-considered responses to telling the truth. 
As a private citizen, I feel obliged to repeat that accurate point - that there is a large 
but hidden welfare component in the major middle class entitlements. It will take an Armey-
type blue-ribbon commission on the budget to wrestle with this problem. There are many ways 
to proceed. Virtually all of them involve facing the hard fact that the customary annual cost-of-
living increases (COLAs) which each recipient now expects as a matter of right is nothing that 
he or she has earned. The COLAs violate the insurance principle that, on average, you get 
what you pay for. 
As a practical matter, it seems impossible to eliminate the annual COLA payments. 
However, some reduction in their size would make a major contribution to bridging the long-
term gap between federal income and federal outgo. A "diet COLA," for example, could be 
limited to the annual inflation in excess of 2 percent. In explanation, we should note that the 
average working person is not protected as completely from the effect of inflation as are the 
beneficiaries of federal entitlements. 
A more modest - but not trivial - way of curbing federal consumption-oriented 
entitlement spending is to eliminate the array of "income-in-kind" benefits, such as food stamps 
and public housing. It is fascinating to behold the inconsistent positions taken by advocates of 
these programs. On the one hand, they vociferously oppose any attempt to slow down their 
growth. On the other hand, they attack any effort to include such income in kind in the official 
measurement of the number of people living in poverty. The advocates point out - quite 
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accurately - that a dollar of federal spending for these social programs does not generate a 
dollar of benefits to the recipients who, if they could, would rather spend some of the money 
on something else. 
One champion of these programs admits that food stamps "certainly aren't worth their 
face value in cash." He suggests that, if these items are included in any measure of poverty, 
they should be discounted by 20 percent or even 40 percent. For starters, why not give the 
beneficiaries the cash value and save the Treasury the difference? If that were done, the major 
complaints would arise from the program administrators rather than from the recipients. 
Curbing Special Interest Subsidies 
Contrary to widespread belief, especially in the business community, the word "farm" 
does not always precede the term "subsidy" in the federal budget. Subsidies to agriculture are 
the largest component of the subsidy category. Nevertheless, subsidies to business, labor, and 
other interests are also provided and often on a generous scale. From the viewpoint of 
fairness, it is hard to justify subsidy programs which typically provide benefits to above-
average income people, quite a few of whom are truly wealthy. 
In the cases of direct payments to farm operators (including deficiency and 
conservation reserve benefits), the wealthiest group of farmers receives an average of more 
than $61,000 a year each while the poorest group receives less than $500 each. Despite the 
traditional justification of helping the family farm, 64 percent of farm operators do not receive 
any such payments. Similarly, 40 percent of the sugar price support program benefits the 
largest 1 percent of sugar farms; the 33 largest plantations each receive more than $1 million. 
Large manufacturing companies also participate in federal subsidy programs. In 1991, 
taxpayers financed generous overseas advertising programs for selected products: $2.9 million 
for Pillsbury muffins and pies, $10 million for Sunkist oranges, $465,000 for McDonald's 
Chicken McNuggets, $1.2 million for American Legend mink coats, and $2.5 million for Dole 




Labor unions are not exempt from the list of special interest subsidies. The Davis-
Bacon Act is a multibillion dollar assist to construction unions which want shelter from 
competition with lower-cost nonunionized firms. As is true for most nonagricultural subsidies, 
the benefits are hidden in larger federal appropriations (public works construction, in this 
instance). The elimination of these subsidies- hidden and visible- would reduce federal 
spending substantially. Dropping subsidy programs from the federal budget would also raise 
the efficiency and productivity of the U.S. economy by widening the array of economic activity 
that is subject to competition in the marketplace. 
Regulation Begets Expenditure 
An obvious example of the shortcomings in one government activity generating 
pressure for an offsetting federal expenditure is regulation of the workplace. We can begin by 
cataloging the different ways in which government rule-making reduces employment. The 
examples constitute a long list: 
1. Equal employment and affirmative action programs. The advertising requirements 
alone often mean that jobs remain unfilled even in the presence of qualified applicants. 
2. Wrongful termination lawsuits which, albeit unintentionally, discourage employers 
from expanding their work forces. 
3. Government-mandated fringe benefits, statutory minimum wages, and compulsory 
personal leave requirements, which result in higher costs of labor that inevitably reduce the 
demand for workers. 
4. Federal disability insurance, which reduces the supply of labor by making it 
attractive for injured people to stay on the benefit rolls. Less than one-half of 1 percent of the 
beneficiaries return to work. This federal expenditure has become an early retirement system. 
These regulatory and mandated burdens on the employment process are rarely 
considered in relationship to the expensive array of government programs that offset their 
adverse affects by trying to increase the supply of workers or to reduce the direct labor costs to 
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employers. Yet the record of these offsetting programs - ranging from job training to 
unemployment compensation- is not heartening. The society would be far better off with a 
combination of regulatory reform and expenditure reductions. Such a targeted and combined 
effort would also contribute to reducing the gap between federal income and outlay. 
Truly Privatizing Federal Activities 
National Airport (in Washington, D.C.) and Dulles Airport (in suburban Virginia) are 
two examples of the federal government's commercial activities which should be sold to the 
highest private bidder. There is no reason why the federal government should continue 
operating these airports, especially in view of the worldwide trend of privatizing airports. 
Likewise, the air traffic controller functions of the Federal Aviation Agency should be 
privatized. The commercial airlines are willing to pay the fees - likely higher than at present 
-to have more efficient service. The resultant reductions in congestion and airplane-and 
passenger-waiting time would more than pay for the transition. 
Using Economic Analysis 
The use of some basic economic efficiency tests would surely improve the overall 
effectiveness of federal spending and likely lower the aggregate level. Here are a few 
examples of what is possible: 
Charge competitive, market interest rates for all federally provided credit. That one 
change will quickly reduce the many demands for federally subsidized lending. Under the 
status quo, numerous borrowers who could obtain credit on their own are given an incentive to 
seek federal aid simply because the federal government charges a lower interest rate than 
commercial banks and other private lenders. Such government competition with the private 
sector makes no sense. 
Use the comparable market rates of interest when evaluating proposed federal 




result in pulling potential investment funds from the private sector to lower-yield public 
projects. By definition, such federal spending is inefficient and a poor use of the taxpayers' 
money. 
Include the government's generous fringe benefits in computing "comparability" of pay 
between federal empluyees and private workers. The compensation of state and local 
government employees should also be included in the calculations. The present system biases 
the calculation of pay standards against the taxpayer. 
Conclusion 
The federal budget contains a hodgepodge of special benefits, inefficient programs, and 
low-return outlays. A blue-ribbon commission, like the Armey base-closing commission is 
needed to objectively identify the low-priority expenditures that should be weeded out. Like 
the successful base-closing commission, the Congress should decide on the commission's full 
package of recommendations by a single up-or-down vote. This innovative procedure would 
prevent the logrolling and attachment of riders, which have resulted in the status quo. 
The following five guidelines are suggested for the use by an Armey-style commission: 
• Focus reductions on the large consumption part of the federal budget rather than 
the small investment component. 
• Eliminate the many subsidy programs that provide special benefits to limited - and 
not especially worthy - parts of the population at the expense of the taxpayer. 
• A void funding expenditure programs that are designed to offset problems created 
by other federal activities, such as regulation. 
• Fully privatize activities which should properly be the responsibility of the private 
sector. 
• Introduce - and enforce - basic economic efficiency in the budget preparation 
and review process, starting with benefit-cost analysis. 
